28th Conclusions Thursday 22 September 1983


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CC(83) 28th

Conclusions



Thursday 22 September 1983

FOREIGN AFFAIRS Hong Kong Previous I Reference: CC(83) 19th Conclusions, Minute 2

THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t t h e n e x t round o f t a l k s w i t h t h e Chinese

Government about t h e f u t u r e o f Hong Kong, which were b e g i n n i n g t h a t

week, would be c r u c i a l and d i f f i c u l t . The U n i t e d Kingdom was f o r t u n a t e

t o have a s k i l f u l and e x p e r i e n c e d n e g o t i a t o r i n S i r Percy Cradock. The

Chinese were i n s i s t i n g n o t o n l y on Chinese s o v e r e i g n t y b u t a l s o on

Chinese a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the whole Colony f r o m 1997 and had so f a r

r e f u s e d t o t a k e any account o f t h e B r i t i s h c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the l i n k

w i t h t h e U n i t e d Kingdom was e s s e n t i a l t o c o n f i d e n c e and hence t o

Hong Kong's c o n t i n u e d p r o s p e r i t y . D e s p i t e t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r

o f the t a l k s , the Chinese were making t h e i r own p o s i t i o n and i n t e n t i o n s

p u b l i c , and t h i s had p r e c i p i t a t e d s e r i o u s f a l l s i n t h e v a l u e o f t h e

Hong Kong d o l l a r and on t h e Hong Kong Stock Exchange. There was l i k e l y

t o be growing P a r l i a m e n t a r y concern about how f a r t h e Government was

t a k i n g account o f t h e wishes o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f Hong Kong, f o u r

m i l l i o n o f whom were refugees f r o m China f o r whom B r i t a i n had a

p a r t i c u l a r moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The Government was i n f a c t i n c l o s e

touch w i t h t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l , t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l and w i t h t h e

e l e c t e d D i s t r i c t C o u n c i l s i n Hong Kong, as w e l l as w i t h o t h e r

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n t h e Colony. A referendum would be a b l e

t o be e x p l o i t e d by t h e Chinese i n a way which would make a f r e e

e x p r e s s i o n o f o p i n i o n i m p o s s i b l e . The overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f t h e

p o p u l a t i o n wanted t h e s t a t u s quo m a i n t a i n e d , b u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y s e n i o r

members o f t h e Hong Kong Chinese community were f r i g h t e n e d t o make t h i s

c l e a r t o the Chinese Government when they v i s i t e d Peking. The Chinese

a u t h o r i t i e s p r e f e r r e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t Hong Kong would c o n t i n u e as b e f o r e

f o l l o w i n g a complete Chinese t a k e o v e r . I t was u n c l e a r how f a r , i f a t

a l l , they understood t h e importance o f t h e c o n f i d e n c e f a c t o r (and hence

of a c o n t i n u e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l i n k w i t h B r i t a i n ) f o r Hong Kong's f u t u r e

p r o s p e r i t y : b u t Chinese n a t i o n a l p r i d e , combined w i t h Communist nonĀ­ comprehension o f how a c a p i t a l i s t system worked, made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r

them t o accept t h a t B r i t a i n should have any r i g h t s i n Hong Kong a f t e r

1997, whatever t h e economic consequences. U n f o r t u n a t e l y B r i t i s h p u b l i c

o p i n i o n tended t o over e s t i m a t e B r i t i s h power and the e x t e n t o f B r i t i s h

l e v e r a g e w i t h t h e Chinese. The t a s k o f t h e B r i t i s h n e g o t i a t o r s i n t h e

coming round would be t o keep t h e Chinese i n p l a y on t h e q u e s t i o n o f

c o n f i d e n c e and c o n t i n u e t o put across t h e B r i t i s h case w i t h o u t prompting

them t o break o f f t h e t a l k s .

The Cabinet -

Took n o t e .

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